Large agricultural investments in Kenya’s Nanyuki Area: Inventory and analysis of business models

Many experts agree that more agricultural investment is needed in the global South to improve local food security and reduce poverty. However, there is a lack of consensus about the types of investment needed to achieve these goals. This paper contributes to the literature on large agricultural investments and corresponding business models by inventorying and analysing such investments in Kenya’s Nanyuki area. We identify four clusters of business models that differ primarily by type of production and other distinct determinants, namely: demand from markets; access to land; land tenure regime and colonial history; actors involved; biophysical context; labour availability; and governance of the value chain via private standards. The study results shed light on the factors that help or hinder implementation of large agricultural investments and shape their impacts in the context of African land use systems. The way land is accessed represents one of the most-decisive factors determining the risks and opportunities associated with such projects. We find that most investments in the Nanyuki area occur on land bought or leased from private owners.     

Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms

We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.     

Institutional distance and Turkey’s outward foreign direct investment

This study empirically examines the relation between institutional distance (ID) and Turkey’s outward foreign direct investment (TODI). The empirical results use panel data from 2002 to 2016 to show that TODI is attracted to countries with better institutional quality. We also find that host country political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of law attract TODI. We also document that TODI is positively related to cultural distance (CD) and ID is not moderated by CD.     

Internal pyramid structure,contract enforcement,minority investor protection,and firms’ performance: Evidence from emerging economies

This study investigates the relationship between internal pyramid structure and performance of Chinese, Pakistani, Malaysian pyramidal firms, the effect of judicial efficiency and minority investor protection on this relationship. The results show that the pyramid structure of Pakistani firms is more complicated than Chinese and Malaysian firms, both vertically and horizontally. The study finds that the impact of control layers on performance is negative and stronger than control chains. Moreover, the results illustrate that the effect of control layers on performance at Chinese firms is negative but lower than at Pakistani and Malaysian firms. However, control chains have insignificant association with performance at Chinese pyramid firms. We find that efficient judiciary abates the negative impact of control layers and chains on performance. Our results reveal that in the absence of efficient courts the minority investors’ protection have insignificant impact on the association between internal pyramid structure and firms’ performance.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

How much does tax erode fund excess returns?

We model the tax drag from active fund management based on reported monthly holdings of active equity funds. Tax drag erodes 65 percent of the 0.74 percent excess return in Broad Market funds, but only 21 percent of the 1.80 percent excess return in Small-Cap funds for Australian superannuation (pension) fund investors. Tax drag varies with investment style; market state, which is most detrimental during bull markets; and fund turnover. For high-income individual investors, tax drag is exacerbated to the extent that active management only generates meaningful after-tax excess return for Small-Cap funds of certain styles.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

Structural holes and hedge fund return comovement: evidence from network-connected stock hedge funds in China

Using data from a new hedge fund database, we examine the impact of social networks on the return comovement of stock hedge funds in China. We use structural holes in the college alumni networks of managers to measure the managers’ social network positions. We perform an empirical analysis on a sample of 3,012 hedge fund products in China from 2010 to 2017. We find that greater structural holes are associated with higher return comovement. The positive impact of the structural holes on return comovement is not affected by market cycles, a manager's major in college, or his or her abilities.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Beta and firm age

We document a robust pattern of beta declining over the age of a firm. We find that changes in systematic risk via firm characteristics and life-cycle stages are insufficient to explain this pattern. Moreover, standard proxies for the quantity and quality of information also explain this pattern only partially. To fully explain this pattern we rely on the increasingly important role of familiarity in financial decision making: familiarity is a determinant of beta and firm age is a proxy for the degree of familiarity that investors feel toward individual stocks. To illustrate the implication of our findings, we document that when we control for firm age there is support for the CAPM and its use as an input for the cost of equity capital calculation.